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Explanatory memorandum 
THE BENEFITS OF BUDGETARY DISCIPLINE FOR GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT 
Sound  and disciplined  public  finances  are  an  essential  condition  for  strong  and 
sustainable growth with improved employment creation. 
Low budget deficits  reduce the public  claims  on the national  product and  lessen the 
burden put on monetary policy ; in addition they contribute to low and stable inflationary 
expectations.  In such a context,  monetary policy can deliver low interest rates.  This 
fosters growth and  employment via crowding-in of private investment with beneficial 
supply side effects. Moreover, fiscal  discipline,  by curbing public debt ratios and hence 
reducing  the  interest  burden  on  public .debt,  will  allow  government  spending  to  be 
restructured, by devoting a higher share of public money to political priorities such as 
infrastructures  and  education  which  are  important  to  build  long-run  growth  and 
employment. 
DURABLE BUDGETARY CONVERGENCE  .IN EMU 
. In  order  to  harvest  the  benefits  .of  the  single  currency,  economic  and  monetary 
convergence in EMU must be durable. This implies, inter alia, low budget deficits on 
a sustained basis. These views, which are widely shared and enshrined in the Treaty, led 
the German Government to present a proposal for a "stability pact for Europe" to ensure 
budgetary  discipline  in  the  final  stage  of EMU.  The  Madrid  European  Council  in 
December 1995 confirmed the crucial significance of  budgetary discipline and noted the · 
Commission's ·intention  "to  present  its  conclusions  on  ways  to  ensure  budgetary 
discipline and coordination in the monetary union  ... ". 
The issue has been actively discussed since then benefiting, inter alia, from the progress 
report presented by the Commission to the European Council in Florence in June 1996, 
according to which any new arrangements should (i) be achieved in the context of the 
Treaty (ii) the requirements for participation in EMU (either in the  first group or 
at a later date) should in no way be changed and (iii) they should be agreed at EU 
level,  even  though  full  application  would  only  concern  the  Member  States 
participating in the single currency. 2 
During the informal Ecofin Council in Dublin  i~ September 1996 these basic principles 
and the main features of  a future stability pact gained wide acceptance. 
The Commission proposals for a stability pact, in line with its progress report, respect 
these  principles.  They take the form  of secondary  legislation  which  strengthens  and 
clarifies Treaty provisions related to multilateral surveillance and budgetary discipline. In 
order to be effective, this will need to be complemented by a strong political commitment 
from  all  those involved to apply  rigorously the procedures  of the  Treaty,  as  further 
specified and clarified by secondary legislation. This commitment could be enshrined in a 
declaration by the European Council. 
A PREVENTIVE AND DISSUASIVE APPROACH 
National budgetary policies in the third stage of  EMU need to be set so as to create room 
for manoeuvre in adapting to exceptional and cyclical disturbances and  so  as  to avoid 
excessive deficits  . In addition,  national budgetary policies  must be supportive. of the 
stability  oriented  single  monetary  policy.  The  appropriate  way  for  Member  States' 
budgetary  policies  to  ensure  such  a  wide  role  is  through  pursuing  medium  term 
budgetary objectives of close to balance or surplus. The 3% of  GDP reference value 
for the deficit is therefore to be seen as an upper limit in normal circumstances. 
In order to make sure that excessive deficits are avoided, the Commission proposes to 
have  a  twin-track  strategy:  a preventive,  early-warning  system  for  identifYing  and 
correcting budgetary slippages before they bring the deficit above the 3% ceiling and  a 
dissuasive set of rules,  With  a sufficient deterrent effect to put pressure  on Member 
States to avoid excessive deficits or to take measures to correct. them quickly if  they do 
occur. 
Improving prevention: the strengthening of budgetary surveillance 
Using the possibilities for secondary legislation provided by Article 103(5), the budgetary 
aspects  of multilateral  surveillance  need  to be  reinforced  so  as  to provide  an  early 
warning system.  This enhanced monitoring would- rely  on an obligation on Member 
States  having adopted the single currency to submit stability programmes setting out 
national  medium-term  budgetary  objectives  and  other  relevant  information~ National 
medium-term budgetary targets should be set close to balance or in surplus, but a certain 
differentiation between countries would be appropriate. This would not be at odds with 
historical experience, as a majority of  the Member States had a budgetary position dose 
to balance before the first oil crisis.  These medium term targets would enable Member 
States  to  respect  the  3%  ceiling  in  all  circumstances,  apart  from  unusually  severe 
economic downturns or other exceptional conditions.  Stability programmes should be 
made public. 
Departures from the budgetary objectives of close to balance or surplus set in the 
stability programmes would prompt a warning fr<?m the Commission. This could lead to 
Council  recommendations  to the Member  State  concerned  with  a  view  to take  the 
necessary measures so as to avoid the risk of  breaching the 3% ceiling. 3 
The strengthening of  surveillance procedures at Community level will also allow to give 
more attention to the coordination of  budgetary policies at EMU level to ensure that the 
different budgetary positions form a coherent picture. 
Enhancing dissuasion: the strengthening of  the excessive deficit procedure 
The application of  the excessive deficit procedure (including the final  step of  sanctions) 
needs to be clarified  and  accelerated so that it  acts as a genuine deterrent.  The main 
elements of  the proposed legislation include: 
•  setting time limits for the key steps of  the procedure so that sanctions would 
be imposed,  where  appropriate,  within  the  calendar year following  the year in 
which the excessive deficit occurs~ 
•  in this context, defining the "exceptional and temporary" circumstances when 
the reference value can be breached~ 
•  pre-determining the scale of  the pecuniary sanctions. 
The  Commission  considers  that the  scope  of its  proposals  for  secondary  legislation 
requires  the  use  of Article  104c(14),  2nd subparagraph  as  legal  basis.  Under  this 
subparagraph, which covers any aspect of the excessive deficit procedure, the Council 
must act unanimously, after consulting both the European.Parliament and the ECB. The 
Commission  believes  that the  credibility  of the  stability  pact,  in  which  all  countries 
commit themselves  to budgetary stability,  will  benefit from  a  unanimous  vote of the 
Member States. Accordingly, the proposed regulation  and the provisions of  Protocol n° 
5, whose present content is left unchanged, will form a new integrated set of  rules. 
The excessive deficit procedure can be speeded up substantially by setting time limits 
for the completion of  key steps. It is suggested that in the standard scenario (see Annex 
1)  the  decision  on  the  existence  of  an  excessive  deficit  and  the  issuing  of 
recommendations should be completed by May in the year following that in which an 
excessive deficit emerges; in the event that the Council judges that insufficient effective 
action  is  being taken by  a  Member  State  to  correct · the  excessive  deficit,  then  the 
remaining steps of  the procedure and the imposition of  sanctions should be completed by 
December of the same year.  It would be possible to activate the procedure earlier in 
situations where planned deficits already exceed the 3% limit and/or recommendations to 
take corrective action have already been made by the Council using the early warning 
system of  Article 103 procedures; however, the decision on the existence of  an excessive 
deficit should normally be taken on the basis of  the data reporting in March. 
In the context of the identification of the existence of an excessive deficit, some of the 
definitions of Article 1  04c can be clarified to remove uncertainty,  although there will 
always have to remain some room for Council discretion. In particular, the interpretation 
of the term "exceptional and temporary" can be clarified to a degree.  Although it  is 
unlikely that all possible relevant situations can be covered explicitly,  an attempt is made 
to illustrate quantitatively what a severe economic downturn may mean. 
Speeding  up  the  later  steps  of the  procedure  will  rely  crucially  on  how "effective 
action" is  to be assessed.  The Commission  proposes to consider publicly  announced 
government  decisions  as the basis for  assessing  appropriateness of the corrective 
measures.  The association of national  parliaments to the enactment of such measures, 
when  required  by  national  law,  should  not  hinder. the  expeditious  application  of the 
excessive deficit procedure and detract from  its urgency.  It is therefore suggested that 4 
there would be a relatively short period by the end of  which a government should have 
adopted  measures  (e.g.  at most  four  months  after the issuing  by  the Council  of the 
Article  104c(7)  recommet:tdation).  If the  government  brought  forward  no  measures 
within  the  time  limit  or the  measures  proposed  were judged  by  the  Council  to  be 
insufficient, then the next step of the procedure would be engaged. If, subsequent to a 
favourable  Council  assessment  of a  package  of measures  ,  a  government  withdrew 
measures or they were voted down by parliament without other sufficient measures being 
substituted, then the Council could immediately decide to move on to the next step of  the 
procedure. 
In any  event,  the  maximum  length of the overall  procedure  including  the  presumed 
decision on sanctions should. not exceed ten. months. While the time delays according to 
the above schedule may at first sight seem short, it should be recognised that the issuing 
of  a Council recommendation or the later steps of  the procedure will come as no surprise 
to a government,  which  will  effectively  have· had  a  much longer period  in  which  to 
prepare corrective measures.  Moreover, the seriousness in  stage three of moving into 
excessive deficit should call for urgent action from all those involved. 
Further specification of  how sanctions would be applied is also necessary. To this end, 
it is  proposed that, as a rule,  a non-interest-bearing deposit will be required whenever 
sanctions are triggered~ possibly supplemented by the non-pecuniary sanctions foreseen 
by the Treaty, to be decided at the cjiscretion of  the Council. 
The  scale  of the  deposits,  which  are  to be  calculated  as  a  %  of GOP,  should  be 
sufficiently  high  in  order  to  have  a  deterrent  effect,  without  however  becoming 
unbearable and thereby losing credibility or being counterproductive. According to these 
principles,  the  Commission  proposes  that  annual  deposits  would  include  a  fixed 
component, equal to 0.2% ofGDP, and a variable component equal to  one tenth of  the 
excess of the deficit over the 3% reference value,  and would be subject to a ceiling of 
0.5% ofGDP. These values imply that any deficit above 6% ofGDP would not carry a 
proportionally higher sanction. The graph in annex depicts the quantitative implications 
of  the proposed rule. 
The initial deposit would be transformed into a fine if, after two years, sufficient action 
to correct the excessive deficit has not been taken. Deposits would be lodged with the 
Community and the interest on deposits,  and fines,  would be resources of the general 
budget ofthe European Communities. I 
5 
How the excessive deficit procedure would work beginning in March 
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8 Proposal for a 
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC)  96/0247 (SYN) 
on the strengthenin& of  the surveiUanee and coordination of  bud&etary positions 
Tiffi COUNCIL OF TIIE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European  Community, and in particular Article 103(5) 
thereot: 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, 
.  In cooperation with the European Parliament, 
(1) Whereas the maintenance of sound budgetaiy positions in the Member States creates the appropriate 
conditions for the sustained growth of output and employment;  whereas budgetary discipline will be  , 
required in the thirdstage of  economic and monetary union to ensure monetmy stability, 
(2) Whereas national budgetary policies need to be set so as to create room for manoeuvre in adapting to 
exceptional and cyclical disturbances and so as to avoid excessive deficits, 
(3)  Whereas  in the  context  of the  single  currency  the  closer  coordination  of budgetaiy  and  other 
economic policies assumes more importance, 
(4)  Whereas the reference value for the government deficit of 3% of GDP  specified in Article  1 of 
Protocol n°  5 on· the excessive deficit procedure is to be  seen as a ceiling in normal  circumstances; 
whereas, therefore, government budgets in the medium term should aim for positions close to balance or 
in surplus, taking due account of differences in national characteristics, 
(5)  Whereas the multilateral  swveillance procedure of Article  101 (3  and 4)should  be  developed  to 
provide an early warning system, in which the Council would alert a Member State to the need to take 
corrective  action  to  prevent  a  government  deficit  becoming  excessive;  whereas  this  multilatenu 
swveillance procedure should continue to monitor the :full range of economic developments in each of 
the Member States and in the Community as well as the consistency of  economic policies with the broad 
guidelines referred to in Article 103(2), 
(  6) Whereas the present Regulation forms part of the stability pact for ensuring budgetary discipline in 
stage three of  EMU; whereas the pact includes two main elements (i) strengthening the surveillance and 
coordination of budgetary  positions  and  (ii)  speeding  up  and clarifying the  implementation  of the 
excessive  deficit.  procedure;  whereas  the  second  of these  elements  provides  time  limits  on  the 
implementation of  the excessive defiCit procedure and a specification of  the imposition of  sanctions, 
(7) Whereas the rul~  for such a speeding up and clarifying of the excessive deficit procedure have been 
laid down in cOuncil Regulation [  .... ), 
.  ,  .... (8)  Whereas  the  Member  States  which  will  adopt  the  single  currency  shall  have  been  found  irl 
accordance  with  Article 109j  .to  have  achieved a high degree  of sustainable  convergence  and  in 
particular a sustainable government. financial  position;  whereas  the maintenance of sound budgetary 
positions in theseMember States will be required to ensure monetaiy stability and to create appropriate 
conditions for the sustained growth of output and employment; whereas these Member States are to' be 
referred to as Member States without a derogation in accordance with Article 109k, 
(9) Whereas there is a need to build upon the useful experience gained during the first two stages of 
economic and monetary union with convergence programmes as instruments for setting objectives and 
providing a basis for  monitoring~ whereas it is important to  place a requirement on Member States 
without a derogation to submit medium-term budgetary programmes (to be called stability programmes) 
and it is necesSary to define the principal contents of such programmes; whereas it is necessary to lay 
down time limits for the submission of  stability programmes and their updates, 
(10) Whereas  in the  intel'est  of transparency and  informed public debate  Member  States without  a 
derogation should be required to make public their stability programmes; 
(11) Whereas there is a need to define rules for the.examination of  stability programmes by the Council, 
(12) Whereas the monitoring of stability programmes should be carried out in the framework  of the 
multilateral surveillance~ whereas particular attention should be given to slippage from the programme 
. targets for the government  surplus/defici~ whereas in order to  prevent a serious deterioration in the 
. deficit position of a Member  State without a derogation  it would be appropriate for the Council  to 
recommend that the Member State take corrective action; whereas in the event of persistent budgetaiy 
slippage the Council should consider it appropriate to reinforce and make public its recommendation; 
(13) Whereas it will also be necessary,to make similar rules covering the programmes and surveillance 
of  the other Member States, 




1.  Each Metllber State without a derogationshall submit to the Council and Commission a "stability 
programme".  · 
2.  A stability programme shall contain: 
(a)  medium-term objective and ac:ljustment path for the government surplus/deficit as a ratio to 
GDP; expected path for the government debt ratio, 
(b)  ~  assumptions  about  expected  economic  developments  such  as  real  GDP  growth, 
employment/unemployment, inflation, and other important economic variables, 
(c)  description of  budgetary measures being taken to achieve the objectives of  the programme, 
(d)  com:nitment to take additional measures when necessary to prevent slippage from targets, 
3.  The information about paths for the government surplus/deficit ratio. and debt ratio and the main 
economic assumptions referred to in paragraph 2(a) and (b) shall be on an annual basis and shall 
cover, as well as the current and preceding year, at least the following three years. Article 2 
1.  Stability programmes shall be submitted before 1 January 1999. Thereafter, updated programmes 
shall be submitted each year,  not later than two months after the presentation of annual budget 
proposals by a Member State government to its national parliament. A Member State for which an 
initial derogation is subsequently abrogated according to Article 109k(2), shall submit a  stability 
programme within six months of  the decision on abrogation. 
2.  Member States shall make public their stability programmes and updated programmes. 
SECTION2 
Surveillance of budgetary positions and early warning sy111em 
Article 3 
1.  Based on assessments by  the Commission and the Committee provided for in Article 109c,  the 
Council shall examine whether, having regard to specific national characteristics, the medium-term 
budget objective in the stability programme is close to balance or in surplus, whether the economic 
assumptions on which the programme is based are realistic and whether the measures being taken 
and/or proposed are sufficient to achieve the targeted adjustment path towards the medium-term 
objective. 
2.  The Council shall make the examination of the stability programme referred to  in paragraph 1 
within  at  most  two  months  of  the  submission  of  the  programme.  The  Council,  on  a 
recOmmendation  from  the  Commission  after  consulting  the  Committee  provided  for  in 
Article 109c, may endorse the stability programme. Where the Council considers that the objectives 
and contents of a  programme should be strengthened, the Council,  as provided for by Article 
103(4), shall in general  make a  recommendation to the Member State  concerned to adjust its 
programme. 
3.  Updated stability programmes shall be examined by the Committee provided for in Article 109c on 
the basis of assessments by  the Commission; if necessary,  updated  programmes  may  also  be 
examined by the Council in accordance with the procedure of  paragraphs 1 and 2. 
Article4 
1.  As  part of the multilateral  surveillance in accordance  with Article  103(3),  the  Council  shall 
monitor the implementation of stability programmes, based on information provided by Member 
States and on assessments by the Commission and the Committee provided for in Article 109c, in 
particular with a view to identifying actual or expected divergence from the medium-term objective 
(or  the  adjustment  path  towards  it)  set  in  the  stability  programme  for  the  government 
surplus/deficit. 
2.  In the event of identified divergence from  the medium-term objective  (or the adjustment path 
towards  it),  the  Council  shall  in  general,  as  provided  for  by  Article  103(4),  make  a 
recommendation to the Member State concerned to take budgetary adjQStment measilres. 
3.  In the event that in subsequent monitoring the divergence from the medium-term objective (or the 
adjustment path towards  it)  is  seen to persist or worsen,  the Council  shall  in general  make a 
recommendation to the Member State concerned to ta,ke specific corrective action and, as provided 
for by Article 103(4), may make its recommendation public. 
4.  As part of the multilateral surveillance in accordance with Article 103(3), the Council shall also 
assess the overall actual and forecast budgetary positions for the EMU area as a whole implied by 
national stability programmes and updated programmes. Article 5 
In  their  reports  to  the  European  Parliament  in  accordance  with  the  second  sub--paragraph  of 
Article 103(4)  the  President of the  COuncil  and  the  Commission  shall  include  the  results  of the 
surveillance carried out in the framework of  this Regulation. 
Article 6 
This Regulation shall enter into force on 1 July 1998. 
This Regulation shall be binding uLits entirety and directly  'apptic:abte in all Member States. 
lo Proposal for a 
COUNCIL REGULATION (ECl  96/0248 (CNS) 
....................... 
on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of  the excessive deficit procedure 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Community,  and  in  particular  the  second 
subparagraph of  Articlel04c, paragraph 14, thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, 
Having regard to the opinion of  the European Parliament, 
Having regard to the opinion of the European Monetary Institute, 
(1) Whereas the maintenance of  sound budgetary positions in the Member States creates the appropriate 
conditions for the sustained growth of output and employment;  whereas budgetary discipline will be 
required in the third stage of  economic and monetary union to ensure monetary_stability, 
(2) Whereas national budgeta.Jy policies need to be set so as to create room for manoeuvre in adapting to 
exceptional and cyclical disturbances and so as to avoid excessive deficits; whereas there is a case for 
giving a rigorous interpretation to the concept of exception and temporary circumstances which could 
involve quantifYing the concept of  significantly negative real growth. 
(3)  Whereas the Protocol W  5 on the excessive deficit procedure  contains provisions relating to  the 
implementation of the procedure foreseen in Article 104c; whereas further implementing provisions are 
necessarY; whereas, according to the second subparagraph of Article 104c(l4), the Council shall adopt 
the appropriate provisions to that effect; whereas the provisions of  this Regulation together with those of 
the Protocol constitute a new integrated set of  rules, 
(4) Whereas, according to Article 109k(3), Articles 104c(9) and (11) only apply to those_ Member States 
having adopted a single currency, 
(5) Whereas there is a need to establish deadlines for the application of  the excessive deficit procedure in 
order to ensure its expeditious and effective  application;  whereas there is a need to  specify how  the 
sanctions foreseen in Article 104c of the Treaty could be imposed on Member States which persistently 
fail to correct an excessive deficit situation-in order to ensure the effective application of the excessive 
deficit  procedure, 
(6) Whereas the present regulation forms part of the stability pact for ensuring budgeta.Jy discipline in 
stage three of  EMU; whereas the pact includes two main elements (i) strengthening the surveillance and 
coordination  of budgetary  positions  and  (ii)  speeding  up  and  clarifying the  implementation  of the 
excessive deficit procedure; whereas the first of these elements provides. an  early warning system in 
which  divergences  from  Member  States  medium-term  budgeta.Jy  paths  are  identified  and 
l1 recommendations made by the  Council to  take. corrective action Well before a deficit position seems 
excessive, 
(7)  Whereas  the  rules  for  such  a  strengthening  of the. surveillan~ and  coordination  of budgetary 
positions have been laid down in Council Regulation[  .... ], 
(8) Whereas the reinforced surveillance in the terms of Regulation[  ... ] together with the Commission's 
monitoring of budgetary positions in accoidance with paragraph 2 of article 104c provide a basis for a 
rapid implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, 
(9) Whereas, in the light of  the above, an overall maximum period often months from the reporting date 
or any  other activation of the procedure until, if necessary,  the  imposition of sanctions  seems  both 
feasible  and appropriate  in order  to  exert  pressure  on  the  Member  State  to  implement  corrective 
measures;  in the event of a procedure starting in March this could lead to sanctions being imposed 
within the calendar year in which the procedure has been started, 
(10)  Whereas  the  issuing  of a  Council  recommendation  or the  later  steps  of the  excessive  deficit 
procedure will come as  no  surprise to a government,  which will  effectively  have had a much  longer 
period in which to prepare corrective measures. Whereas the seriousness of  moving into excessive deficit 
in stage three should call for urgent action from all those involved, 
( ll) Whereas when acting with a view to correct the excessive deficit the government of the Member 
State concerned will, if  required by  national  law,  take measures associating the national parliament; 
whereas the national decision-making process in accordance with article 3 of  the Protocol n° 5,  should 
not, as such, hinder the expeditious implementation of  the excessive deficit procedure, 
(12) Whereas it is considered that, in order to ensure that the excessive deficit procedure has a sufficient 
deterrent effect, a non interest bearing deposit of appropriate size should be required from the Member 
State concerned when the Council decides to impose a sanction, 
(13)  Whereas the definition of sanctions on a prescribed scale removes  ~certainties and would thus 
allow those involved in the procedure to have full information about it; whereas it is appropriate to relate 
the amount of  the deposit to the GDP of  the Member State concerned; whereas it is appropriate that the 
deposit should consist of  a fixed comporlent due in all cases when pecuniruy sanctions are imposed and a 
variable component proportional  to  the excess  of the  deficit over the  3% of GDP  reference  value; 
whereas it is·also appropriate to fix a maximum amount, as a percent ofGDP, to the sanctions for the 
latter not to have counterproductive effects, 
(14) Whereas in the event that the constitution of a non-interest-bearing deposit does not induce the 
Member State concerned to correct its excessive deficit then it is appropriate to intensifY the sanctions; 
whereas it is therefore appropriate to transform the deposit into a fine in such an event and require the 
· Member State concerned to constitute a new non-mterest-bearing deposit 
(15) Whereas action by the Member State concerned with a view to correcting its excessive deficit is the 
first step towards abrogation of  sanctions; whereas significant progress in correcting the excessive deficit 
should allow for some lifting of sanctions in accordance with paragraph 12 of  article 104c; whereas the 
abrogation of  all outstanding sanctions should only ~once  the excessive deficit has been corrected; 
(16) Whereas Council Regulation EC n° 3605/93  on the· application of the Protocol on the excessive 
deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Communityl sets detailed roles for the 
reporting ofbudgetary data by the Member States,  · 
1  Wn°Lll2,lU2.9l~p.1. (17) Whereas, according to Article 109f(8), where the Treaty provides for a  consultative role for the 
European Central  Bank (ECB),  references  to the  ECB  shall be read as referring to the  European 
Monetary Institute before the establishment of  the ECB, 
HAS ADOPTED TinS REGULATION: 
SECTION 1 
Speeding up the excessive deficit procedure 
Article 1 
1.  The Council shall decide on the existence of  an excessive deficit in accordance with Article 104c(6), 
within three months of the reporting dates established in Articles 4.2 and 4.3 of Council Regulation 
EC/3605/93.  Where  it  decides  on  the  existence  of an  excessive  deficit  in  accordance  with< 
Article 104c(6)  the  Council  shall  issue  recommendations  to  the  Member  State  concerned  in 
accordance with Article 104c(7) at the same time. 
2.  The excess of a government .deficit over  the reference value shall be considered exceptional  and 
temporary, in accordance with Article 104c(2a) 2nd indent, when resulting from an unusual event 
outside the control of the relevant Member State and which has  a  major impact on the financial 
position  of the  general  government,  or when  resulting  from  a  severe  economic  downturn,  in 
particular in the case of  significantly negative annual real growth. In addition, if  the unusual event or 
the severe economic downturn has come to an end or if  it  is forecast that it will come to an end in the 
calendar year following the year in which the deficit exceeds the reference value, budgetary forecasts 
provided by the Commission must indicate that the deficit would fall below the reference value in 
this same following year. 
·Article 2 
1.  Any Council decision to make its recommendations public having established that no effective action 
has been taken in accordance with Article 104c(8) shall be taken within four months of  the decision 
on the existence of an excessive deficit taken in accordance with Article 104c(6) and the issuing of 
recommendations in accordance with Article 104c(7). 
2.  The  Council,  when  considering  whether  effective  action  has  been  taken  in  response  to  its 
recommendations issued in accordance with Article 104c(7), may base its decision on official public 
decisions by .the Government of the Member State concerned. 1f these official public decisions are 
. not, if  necessary, enacted by nation8I legislatures within a time limit to be defined by the Council in 
its  recommendations issued in accordance with Article  104c(7),  or if  the decisions  are modified 
substantially during the adoption process, then the Council shall reconsider whether effective action 
has been taken. 
Article 3 
Any Council decision to give notice to the Member State to take measures for the deficit reduction in 
accordance.  with Article  104c(9)  shall  be taken within one  month of the.  Council  decision  that no 
effective action has been taken in accordance with Article 104c(8). 
/3 Article 4 
Where the conditions to apply Article 104c(ll) are met, the Council will, as a rule, decide to impose 
sanctions in accordance with Article 104c(ll). Any such decision shall be taken no later than two 
months after the Council decision to give notice to the Member State to take measures in accordance 
with Article 104c(9). 
Article 5 
The total time between the  reporting dates referred to in Article 1 rif this. Regulation and  a  Council 
decision on the imposition of sanctions refemd to in Article 4 of this Regulation shall not exceed ten 
months. 
Article 6 
Any Council decision to intensify sanctions (other than the imposition of  fines dealtwith in Article 9 of 
this Regulation) in accordance with Article  104c(ll), or to abrogate some or all of its decisions  in 
accordance with Article  104c(l2), shall be taken no later than two months after the reporting dates 




Whenever the  Council  decides  to  apply  sanctions to a  Member  State  in accordance  with  Article 
104c(ll),,  a  non-interest-bearing deposit would,  as a  rule,  be required.  The Council  may decide  to 
supplement this deposit by the measures foreseen in the first and second indents of  Article 104c(ll). 
Article 8 
When the excessive deficit results from non-compliance with the criterion relating to the government 
deficit ratio in ~cle  104c(2a), the amount of  the deposit shall comprise of  a fixed component equal to 
0.2% of GDP, and a variable component equal to one tenth of the difference between the deficit as a 
percentage of GDP of  the year in which such deficit was deemed excessive and the reference value. An 
upper limit of  0.5% of  GDP is set for the annual amount of  deposits. 
When  the excessive  deficit  results  only  from  non-compliance  with  the  criterion  relating  to  the 
government debt ratio in Article 104c(2b),the amount of  the deposit shall comprise of  a fixed component 
equal to 0.2%ofGDP. 
Article 9 
The initial deposit will, as a  rule,  be converted  into a  fine if within the two subsequent years the 
excessive  deficit  has,  in the view of the Council,  not been corrected.  The Council  may  decide  to 
supplement this fine by the measwes foreseen in the first and second indents of Article 1  04c(ll) if  the 
latter had not been applied at the moment of imposing sanctions. At the same time the Member State 
should be required to make a new non-interest-bearing deposit calculated according to the rule set out in 
Article 8 of  this Regulation. 
Article 10  · 
In accordance with Article 104c(l2), the Council  may decide to abrogate some or all the sanctions 
defined in the first and second indents of  Article 1  04c(  11) to the extent that the Member State is making 
significant, though not yet sufficient progress in correcting the excessive deficit 
/'1 , Article 11 
In accordance with Article 104c(l2). the Council shall abrogate all outstanding sanctions if  the decision 
on the existence of  an excessive deficit is abrogated. Fines imposed in accordance with Article 9 of this 
Regulation will not·be returnect.io the Member State concerned.· 
Article 12 
Deposits as specified in Article 8 of  this Regulation shall be lodged with the Commission. Interest on the 
deposits. and fines specified in Article 9 of  this Regulation constitute resources of  the general budget of 
the European Communities. 
Article 13 
This Regulation shall enter into force on I January 1999. 
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. p.7Dii· ..  -------------------
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